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Summary: 
 
This work originates from the statement that the design of organizations was not 
considered in a systematic way by the theorist or the expert of the field. The word design is 
not mentioned, or if it is, it is generally assimilated to the choice of a structure in a constraint 
environment.  
We will however show in the present contribution that organizations can really be regard 
as artifact and by this way that it is possible to develop a science of organization design. To 
this end we will first present what science of design and Artificialism are.  
Then it will be possible to consider the multiples implications of the aforesaid point of 
view for the theory of the firm and to whom such a work can be useful. 
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For an Artificialist way of thinking organization  
 
 
Introduction 
The literature devoted to the firm is particularly flourishing. Paradoxically, many 
authors and experts draw up a mitigated evaluation of it, considering that various 
theories can hardly be said to be theories of the way the firm really are. The 
consequences of such a situation is that, on the one hand,  the building of theories of the 
firm looks like a “cacophony of speech" [Brechet, 1999] and, on the other hand, that the 
firm remain a “terra incognita” for a majority of economists [Dréan, 2002].  
At the same time, and although the first research program relating to the science of 
the design was launched more than thirty years ago by famous theorists like H. Simon, 
we cannot help but notice that this science remains neglected by the theorists of the 
firm. 
More precisely, the design of organization was not considered in a systematic way by 
the theorist or the expert of the field. The word design is not mentioned, and if it is, it is 
generally assimilated to the choice of a structure in a constraint environment. The 
design is then comparable with a simple choice : for this  environment, choosethat type 
of organization [Lawrence, Lorsch, 1969].  
The question of the design of organizations is thus apprehended from the 
organizational structure point of view and not from that of process [Aoki, 1986; Sah and 
Stiglitz, 1986; Radner 1996], which in other words corresponds more to the design of 
the decision than to the design of the organization [Roux, 2003]. 
Is it necessary to conclude that we had better not develop researche towards a science of 
design ? Certainly not !  
In the present contribution we wish to show how the artificialist approach to 
organization, which systematizes H. Simon’s point of view, opens new prospects for the 
theory for the firm. 
But before going further in the presentation of such prospects, it is advisable to first 
present what the science of the design is. Then it will be possible to appreciate if firms 
can be considered as artifacts and by doing this to question the implications of the 
aforesaid sciences for the theory of the firm. 
 
1. WHAT IS SCIENCES OF DESIGN ABOUT? 
Whereas the world is filled with artificial objects, i.e. entities, tangible or not, which 
have been conceived intentionally in order to meet needs, one can only note that science 
was  primarily focused, throughout the 19th century, on natural objects.  
Does this fact mean that artificial objects are not worthy of interest? That they are not 
understandable, and finally that they could not be teached? Obviously not!  
As early as 1969 with his work The Science of the Artificial, H. Simon showed that 
sciences of design – or what he called sciences of the artificial or sciences of 
engineering - are sciences as fundamental as usual sciences of analysis.  
According to Simon, objectives and singularities of sciences of design may be 
expressed as follows: « whereas the sciences of nature aim at showing that the 
marvellous is not incomprehensible, to show how it can be understood,the  sciences of 
design seek to explain how the multiple artifacts which characterize the human societies 
are designed » [Simon, 1991].  
This reversing of perspectives brought forward by the sciences of design may seem 
trivial but is in fact of paramount importance. It leads to seeing the world of the 
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artificial as the result of the way man apprehends his external environment so as to act 
on its components in order to satisfy his needs [Simon, 1969].  
Adopting such a point of view lead us to note that the object of knowledge of such a 
science is not the object as such - i.e. the artifact in its existential reality - but the 
process of design: « one possible definition of design as a scientific discipline would be 
a study of the thought process comprising the creation of an artifact in a given (social, 
technical, economical, etc.) environment. » [Kryssanov, Tamaki, Kitamura 2001]. 
In other words, sciences of design postulate the non-existence of a metaphysics of 
the artifact, that is to say a theory which would explain its raison d’être outside the 
conscience and the actions of man. As such, it allows us to consider the major 
difference from naturalism because sciences of design place design at the heart of man’s 
actions. Adopting such a point of view saves theorists from making  some hypothetical 
speculations on artifacts origin « transformism, evolutionism, genetic, natural selection, 
divine creationism » [Le Moigne, 1995: 157]. 
One is also led to consider that the stake of a science  of design is not only 
operational and turned towards the instituted designers [Forest, Mehier, Micaelli, 2005]. 
It is also an epistemological stake. 
During a long time, design was considered only in terms of a problem-solving 
process. However, design can no longer be reduced to this. 
By making it possible to account for novelty [Kryssanov, Tamaki, Kitamura 2001; 
Hatchuel, 2002; Lester & Piore, 2005], the analysis of the process of design implies that 
creativity can no longer be considered as belonging to the field of the unexplainable 
[Faucheux, Forest, 2006]. It allows the questioning of possible worlds instead of real 
world [Roozenburg, 2002], the exceeding of the probable one [De Jong, 2002], and thus 
the founding of an epistemology of invention, that is, of what one conceives and what 
does not yet exist [Schmid, 2005]. 
Taking into account such a point of view leads us to consider the science of design 
as the science of " ingenuity ", the science of creative thought and not simply expertise 
turned towards the application of already learned models.  
By doing this, we are brought closer to the concept of ingenium theorized by J.B. 
Vico, which refers to a type of transversal rationality. The ingenium being this faculty to 
connect, to establish a correlation between phenomena distant from one another , is 
opposed to the academic, analytical reason which is the source of the current knowledge 
cartography «because the analytical method harms ingenium (or ingeniousness) and 
ingenium was given to man to understand, i.e. to make » [Vico, 1710, 1981]. 
More precisely, the ingenium concept, which seems to refer to the Greek mètis and 
to the thought of Ulysses, is the inventiveness thought [Faucheux, Forest, 2006], 
opposed to Cartesian reason which has been, according to J.B. Vico, at the origins of 
none of the great technical inventions of his time [Pons, 2003]. Finally, we can infer 
from the above presentation, that the sciences of design are about the elaboration of a 
science of creativeness. 
The object of a science of design having been presented the question is whether it is 
possible to regard organizations as artifacts.  
To this end we will now, and without claiming exhaustiveness, give an outline of the 
various meanings of the organization as artifact.  
2. ORGANIZATION AS ARTIFICIAL ENTITY: AN OLD POINT OF VIEW 
J.P Micaelli underlines that « if one is to consider a technical object as an artifact – 
that is to say to search in its initial design the causes of its existence and in its 
successive redesign those of its dynamics – does not seem to pose problem, one can 
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nevertheless note that to recognize organization as artifact and then to imagine a 
science which is dedicated to it, causes the reserve of the theorist or the expert, or at 
best leaves them doubtful » [Micaelli, 2006].  
More precisely we will show in the present section that while regarding 
organizations as artificial entities is not new, H Simon introduced a major break with 
traditional views by claiming that organizations are artifacts.  
We will then see how the change of emphasis suggested by H. Simon – from the 
organization as artificial entity to the organization as artifact – opens with new 
directions of research.  
2.1 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE ARTIFICIAL POINT OF VIEW 
As we have suggested before, while the concept of artificiality applied to 
organization is not recent, one should note that it was first employed in the sense of 
non-natural or fictitious 
According to D. Gindis in “Some building blocks for a theory of a firm as a real 
entity” [Gindis, 2006], two representations of the firm exist at the end of the 19th 
century, each of them carrying direct implications for current debates on how firms 
should be run.  
The first one considers the firm as a fiction. This view is as old as Roman law, and 
refers to an artificial construct under the law which is merely used for convenience. This 
view is far from being forgotten, since it is according to the author the basis of the 
modern nexus of contracts theory of the firm.  
The second one, the real entity theory, goes in the opposite direction and stresses that 
firms are natural entities: «  a corporation is an entity – not imaginary or fictitious, but 
real, not artificial but natural [Machen, 1911] » [Gindis, 2006].  
The question we are interested in here is whether it is (or not) in the nature of the 
firm to be a natural object.  The artificial qualifier is usually used in its most immediate 
sense: that which is artificial is not natural. From our perspective, and as we will see 
later on, this representation is relatively poor insofar as the question of the design of the 
firm is missing. 
2.2. WHAT ABOUT THE AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE? 
One finds roughly the same situation within the Austrian tradition, and in particular 
in Hayek’s thought due to the distinction which he introduces between order (i.e. the 
spontaneous result of the individual actions and not the intentional result of a plan) and 
organization (i.e. intentionally created construction in which each individual works 
towards a common end (purposeful construct)). 
Indeed, Hayek, faithful to the research program relating to the spontaneous order 
tradition initiated in Scotland in the 18th century with authors such as A. Smith and A. 
Ferguson in particular, attempted to understand how institutions can be the unintentional 
result of human action or, to use the terms of A. Ferguson, « the products of human 
action but not human design », or those of C. Menger « How can it be that institutions 
which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development come 
into being without a common will directed toward establishing them ? » [Menger 1985 
(1883):146 in Horwitz 2001].  
By doing this, Hayek concentrated his research on market analysis neglecting in fact 
the organizations’ functioning. It seems that this is the reason why there is not a theory 
of the firm among Austrians: « More specifically, as Loasby [1989], Langlois [1992] 
and Foss [1994, 1996] have noted, Austrian economists have never attempted to 
produce an Austrian theory of the firm » [Ioannides  1999]. 
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From the preceding, one will nevertheless retain that while the Austrians, and in 
particular Hayek, did not analyze the question of the design of organizations in return 
they do not refuse the idea that organizations can be designed. 
2.3. J.R. COMMONS’ ARTIFICIALISM 
The situation is about the same among old institutionnalists. If the process of conflict 
resolution is, according to J.R. Commons, the instigator of institutional  evolution, on 
the other hand his point of view is very different from which of T. Veblen because he 
stresses that one should take into account the short term and claims that the 
aforementioned process cannot only be conceived as undergone and escaping from 
human will and action. 
By considering the role of intentions on the one hand and the negotiated character of 
the decisions on the other hand, J.R. Commons adopts a position contrary to that of 
Hayek.  
As underlined by L. Bazzoli, "social order is an order built by collective action, and 
not a spontaneous order such as it was defined by the Scottish philosophers". Such a 
statement leads the author to conclude that "this social system representation  that one 
could describe as "artificialist"  implies that the organized individuals, if they are 
determined by the institutions in which they intervene, have in return a certain amount 
of power over them" [Bazzoli 1995: 38-39]. 
Nevertheless, while the rupture introduced by J.R. Commons is far from negligible, 
and led some authors to underline the artificial character of a histheoretical framework, 
one can only consider it regrettable that the process of design is not specified. 
From our perspective, this is the reason why it is difficult to regard J.R. Commons as 
an artificialist author. 
2.4. BUILDINGS BLOCKS FOR A THEORY OF THE FIRM AS AN ARTIFACT 
A. Demailly and J.L. Moigne, in the introduction of their work Sciences of the 
Intelligence, Sciences of artificial, underline H. Simon’s audacity "claiming in 1943 at 
twenty seven years a thesis whose central argument was: social organizations are not 
given, they are designed” [Demailly, Le Moigne, 1986].  
Since this date Simon was always interested in the « artificialist » nature of 
organizations. He claimed in his book Administrative Behavior written  in 1947 that the 
design of organization is not different from an architectural one. He therefore strongly 
believed in 1969 in his work The Sciences of the Artificial that there was no reason for 
limiting the word "artifact" to simple technical objects. 
According to him the project of understanding the genesis and/or the evolution of an 
organization consists in answering the following questions: Who designs? What are the 
designer’s goals ? What  is the process followed?, How does one arrive at such a 
decision? These questions seek to make design the central process of the dynamics of 
organizations but also introduces, without any doubt, a serious amount of historical 
relativism. 
Unfortunately, although H. Simon is recognized as a theorist of organization, it 
should be observed that the arguments which refer to the artificial nature of 
organizations are disseminated throughout his work. This is perhapsthe reason why his 
theory of design, which from our perspective seems an important contribution, is less 
well known by economists. 
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Systematizing this work, the artificialism approach [Micaelli, Forest, 2003] sees the 
organization as an object having artificial properties and identifies its designer, that is, 
the manager in the case of the large modern company. 
3. IS IT LÉGITIMITATE TO CONSIDER ORGANIZATIONS AS ARTIFACTS? 
Artificialism is a theoretical framework of the origin and dynamic of artifacts. It 
relies on five key propositions constituting its core: 
Proposition 1 — Artifacts are « universal » (the universality is not seen here in 
terms of time and space but in terms of objects). 
Proposition 2 — The existence and the dynamics of artifacts result from the 
design process.  
Proposition 3 — Design is submitted to a time constraint. Design is creative (i.e. 
its result and its process cannot be predicted). Design is proactive (it is not 
possible to design without any intermediate artifacts). Design is evaluative 
(designing implies evaluating the performances of that which is being designed 
and of how it is being designed). Finally, design is complex (different views are 
required in the design process).  
Proposition 4 — Design can be empirically and experimentally observed and 
therefore theorized at different and complementary levels (macro, meso, and 
micro). 
Proposition 5 — Design being both universal and creative, the dynamics of a 
system of artifacts (the succession of artifacts made by man) is not gradual. There 
can qualitative, unforeseeable, important and fast leaps in the dynamics of 
artifacts [Micaelli, Forest, 2003]. 
As is shown in these five propositions, artificialism is partial. It does not cover the 
whole field of human actions. It cannot explain the reason why any given value, conflict 
(social or not), macroactor (professional, political, social, etc. group) appear at a given 
time in a given place. However artificialism can explain how the above groups design 
alternative artifacts (fashion, propaganda, lobbying, etc.) from the needs induced by 
those values.  
Artificialism centers on the tactical dimension of actions, that is to say on the process 
responsible for the transition from the formulation of a need to the realization of a 
satisficing solution in a given time interval. 
Following artificialism, an artifact can be regarded as such, if and only if, it has been 
designed by man in order to satisfy a need. Thus, applied to organizations, the first line 
of demonstration relates to the existence of goals, while the second to that of a design 
process. What does exactly?  
3.1 RELEVANCE OF ARTIFICIALISM KEY PROPOSITIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS 
While for H. Simon there is no doubt that « similar lists of desiderata that must be 
attended to could be drawn up for designing organizations » [Simon 1995: 251], one 
can note that there seems to exist a relatively broad consensus: « Organizations are 
social inventions, that is, they are created by people for specific purposes at a 
particular time in history (...). The structure of an organization reflects the objectives it 
sought to accomplish» [Davis, 1982: 213]. Moreover, A. Martinet and A. Silem 
underline that dealing with firm performances without stating the goals, the objectives, 
and the strategies pursued does not make any sense.  
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Integrating goals and objectives leads us to consider organizations as artifacts in the 
same way as any technical object and more generally any material or immaterial objects 
designed by man.  
This is not just an intellectual point of view. Based on a comparison of organizational 
models of different car manufacturers, P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, in their work 
Economics, organization and management show, right from chapter one, that success 
(or indeed failure) of an organizational model is linked to its relevance (or irrelevance) 
with regard to the goals and very objectives of the organization. 
If the first proposition of artificialism were to be accepted, does this mean the same 
thing for the second proposition? Can we really speak of organization design?  
Here again it seems that the answer is affirmative as noted by D. Muster and W. 
Weekes:“Engineering and organizational design deal with differententities but the 
process is the same » [Muster, Weekes, 1985: 137] ; or by L. Davis: « design process 
(…)[is] the process of inventing or creating or forming an organization within which the 
efforts of many people are combined and coordinated to achieve the goals crucial to the 
organization’s survival and success » [Davis, 1982 :211].  
In addition, many works converge to present the organizations design process as a 
multi stages problem resolution process [Muster, Weekes, 1985; Perrin, 1994] that 
makes possible the emergence of a satisficing concept of solution [Simon, 1969, 1995]. 
, As H. Simon underlined it, citing the example of the Congress initiated post-war 
Marshall plan design that was operated by the Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA): « The goal of the legislation was to provide the European nations with funds 
and goods that would enable them to revive their own productive capacities. But there 
were different ways in which an organization could have been structured to do that. The 
ECA could have been an organization for processing European shopping lists, 
validating them, and aiding procurement. That was one model. Another conceiving the 
ECA as an extension of the State Department, organized to engage in bilateral 
negotiations with individual nations to fix the terms on which aid would be offered. A 
third model – the one followed – conceived the organization as a nucleus around which 
economic cooperation among the European states could develop, so that they would be 
led toward a European economy very different from the fragmentation of the pre-War 
era. » [Simon, 1995: 256 ]. 
Thus artificialism breaks radically away from theories that recognize any optimal 
organizational structure. At best, an organizational structure can be said to be 
satisficing. Artificialism, most probably because it cannot be and does not claim to be 
predictive, therefore appears more robust than previous theories. Quite obviously, the 
« one best way » idea, applied to organizations, does not make sense. The adopted 
solution is contextualised with regards to the objectives of the organization as defined at 
a given time with given values but also to the way production is thought out. Therefore, 
transposing a successful solution from a given organization to another is characteristic 
of a total misunderstanding of the genesis process of firms and their dynamics. 
This example also shows that not only do alternatives emerge in the design process, 
the problem also does. By designing we learn what we want.  
Building on H. Simon’s example of oil painting, J.L Lemoigne explains that the 
design process is the process through which an ongoing system defines new 
intermediate goals which in turn trigger the identification of new means («Means-Ends 
analysis»). These new means may then suggest new goals: « When using oil paint, each 
brush stroke creates a new kind of organisation which yields a source of new ideas for 
the painter. Painting is a cyclical interactive process between the painter and the 
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painting in which ends lead to new brush strokes while the gradually changing 
organization of the painting suggests new goals » [Simon in LEMOIGNE 2002: 4]. 
The consequence of such an assessment on the dynamics of the design process is that 
reducing design to a situation of choice is a misunderstanding of the reality of design. 
Choice is only a minor part (for which time and resources spent are a unit) of the 
designer’s activity: « I do not wish to dwell upon the choice aspect of design, for it is 
not the aspect on which designers spend most of their time and energy. Most design 
resources go into discovering or generating alternatives, and not into choosing among 
them » [Simon 1995: 247]. 
In other words designing is not only a matter of choosing among pre-existing 
alternatives. It is from the combination of hypotheses that alternatives and therefore 
creation emerge. And it is impossible to consider the result ex ante [Simon 1995]. 
3.2 ARTIFICIALISM: A UNIVERSAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK?  
The above arguments lead us to consider organizations as artifacts, like any technical 
objects and more generally like all the material or immaterial objects designed by man. 
However, is there really no difference with a simple technical object? 
Some, opposing ontological arguments, related to the essence and irreducible 
singularities of organization, will undoubtedly claim that our conclusion is a little hasty 
on this point. That it is not in the nature of the organization to be an artifact [Micaelli, 
Forest, 2003]. 
Nevertheless one must note that this type of argument stresses more the singularities 
of the organization than an impossibility of regarding it as an artifact. 
Others will stress that there are notorious differences between the design process of 
an organization and that of a technical object. This point of view is undeniable.  
Arguably, in addition to the fact that one is dealing with designers who are unaware 
of themselves, in the majority of cases there is no set of conditions allowing one to test 
(i.e. to simulate) the alternative organizational concepts ex ante, unlike a mechanical 
system for example. 
Indeed, the impossibility of simulation for the design of organizations is reinforced 
by that of correctly identifying the representations of its future members and 
anticipating the induced effects. This problem is even more complex if one considers 
that the system is itself a representation (a design) of those who observes it [Le Moigne, 
1985; Genelot, 1992; Perrin, Forest, 2002]  
Do these differences, which by no means exhaust the argument, preclude us from 
regarding organizations as artifacts? Undoubtedly not!  
There is effectively no more difference between the design process of an 
organization and that of a vehicle, than between the design process of a software and 
that of a public space or between the design process of a landing gear of a plane and that 
of the brake of a child's scooter. 
Moreover, it should be stressed that claiming that mechanisms can be different from 
one artifact to another is, here again, more a matter of stressing the singularities of the 
organization than to underline the impossibility of regarding it as an artifact.  
In other words, it is necessary to understand that the concepts and key propositions of 
artificialism have not been theorized and developed to account for only simple technical 
objects and that the social sciences can potentially adopt them. 
Artificialism, indeed, was not developed to serve a unique discipline (mechanical 
design, urban space design...) or group of disciplines: the engineering sciences for 
example. Artificialism acts as a generic (universal) theoretical framework of the 
emergence and dynamics of artifacts that mechanics, computer science, biology, 
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economics, and other disciplines can each mobilize without questioning their 
specificity.  
In addition, it is necessary to underline that the will to restrict the space of 
artificialism to engineering sciences only is the result in the majority of cases of a real 
ignorance of the way technical objects are designed.  
It is precisely the case of F. Hayek when he rejects socialist planning on the basis of 
the limits of human rationality on the one hand, and on that of our capacity to design 
top-down solutions for social problems on the other hand: « There is nothing in the 
ideal of the Enlightenment that commits one to applying inappropriately the methods of 
science, which are so powerful and productive in their own arena, to the social world. 
The mindset of the scientist or the engineer is inappropriate for solving human 
problems » [Horwitz, 2001].  
Hayek’s refusal to make use of scientific methods resulting from the engineering 
sciences for social problems is indeed founded on a double error of judgement. The first 
is to believe that all can be known. The second is that when we design a technical object 
we know ex ante what will emerge. However, whoever has been in a situation of design 
knows that this postulate is unfortunately false. 
From what precedes one will retain that claiming that there are differences in the way 
the need emerges for example not only does not question the generics of the 
artificialism framework, but on the contrary, leads us to thorough research in order to 
better understand the design process of the different classes of artifact [Forest, 2005]. 
4. WHY TODEVELOP ORGANIZATION RESEARCH TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF DESIGN? 
To consider organizations from the point of view of the design sciences is useful to 
three types of actors: the manager as the designer of organizations, the teacher who 
trains the aforementioned managers and the researcher. 
4.1 CONTRIBUTION TO MANAGERS 
A priori, managers seem to be the first concerned by the development of organization 
research towards a science of design.  
Why? Because this research should be able to help them to understand and exercise 
their professional activity. 
Stating that organizations are designed and elaborated artifacts leads us to focus on 
the analysis of organization design process. Today there is a severe lack of knowledge 
on the choices made, on the dynamics of the process. The very few existing publications 
come from business literature and, if we take a closer look, do not deal with 
« organization » or « organizational design » as one might expect but with what may 
better be termed « organization re-design ». The question is: can we do without research 
on organization design ? This seems all the more paradoxical than for the past few years 
creating new businesses is at the forefront of French economic policies. 
What is at stake is thus the development of knowledge on organizations design 
process. More precisely, the aim is to establish a scholarship backed up by history 
through a reflection on the ways the science of design can take into account 
organizational problems. 
However, it is less interesting to describe the external aspects of organizations or to 
compare their « design ». What matters is the analysis of the design process of their 
structure [Perrin, 1994]. Recognizing that organizations are the result of a design 
process implies trying to unveil the content of design stages and more particularly their 
« conceptual design » and « embodiment design » stages. In fact, we believe that this is 
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the condition for an explanation of what really occurs and for an understanding of why 
protean entities can coexist.  
The stake is resolutely practical here. The objective is to gain knowledge which 
enables managers to better understand in a reflexive way their activity and their position 
in the process in order to improve their location. This knowledge can take the form of 
concepts or models of the process. From a more operational point of view this 
knowledge can be valorized through the production of guides, methods and tools, 
dedicated to the improvement of their activity. 
Indeed, we hypothesize that any improvement in our understanding of the design 
process should have positive effects on organizations by identifying key factors for 
example. We hypothesize that such work could help us appreciate the possibility of 
deploying methods developed to assist the design of technical objects for the 
organizations too. 
4.2. CONTRIBUTION TO TEACHERS  
To consider organizations from the point of view of the design sciences is also useful 
for teachers who train the aforementioned managers.  
According to H. Simon, whoever imagines some provisions in order to change an 
existing situation into a preferred one is a designer [Simon, 1991]. He thus concludes 
that it is design which makes the difference between sciences and professions and that 
engineering, architecture, management schools as well as the faculty of medecine or the 
institutes which train teachers, are all concerned by the process of design. 
This is not an isolated point of view.  
C. Schmitt and M. Bayad, basing their research on that of A. Martinet and that of R. 
Teulier-Bourgine, underline that many tasks in organizations are tasks of design 
[Schmitt & Bayad, 2004].  
One is thus led to a shift from the vision of the manager/decision maker to that of the 
manager/designer.  
Considering managers as designers leads, however, to wondering about what their 
competencies really are. This is precisely the problem. 
Building on the work of R. Hayes and W. Abernathy and on that of T. Peters and R. 
Waterman, D. Musters and W. Weekes stress the vacuity of our education system to in 
terms of managerial training: « Without doubt, our education system has been successful 
in training analysts (…). However, we appear to have virtually ignored the training of 
inventors, creative designers, synthesists and generalists » [Muster & Weekes, 1985].  
The work Made in America, published in 1990 by M. Dertouzos, R. Lester and R. 
Solow, as well as the National Research Council report Improving engineering design: 
designing for competitive advantage, also arrive at the same conclusions.  
This is why we think that by developing the science of design we also contribute to 
the building of a "science of organization design" that we are persuaded is necessary for 
the training of managers, too strongly embedded in the traditional representation of the 
firm based on the emblematic figure of the super calculating and optimizingr decision 
maker and insufficiently on that of the ingenious and creative decision maker.  
Thus, the major contribution of a science of design to teachers is to give them the 
possibility to effectively train designers through a new representation and understanding 
of real managerial activity. 
4.3. CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCHERS  
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One must add to the practical and institutional stake of developing organization 
research oriented towards a science of design an epistemological one.  
Why? Because developing such a point of view is, for a community of researchers, a 
necessary way of examining the nature of the knowledge produced but also about the 
methodologies used in its produce .  
To dispose of a research methodology (or some methodologies) is indeed important 
for recognition in the scientific space of research. To this end, we believe that 
empiricism is an alternative research methodology,  adequate for the founding of a 
realistic theory of the firm and of its evolution. 
Following the artificialism point of view, an artifact can be defined in an empirical 
way. The association of an object to a designer and to a process of design or a process 
of redesign - synonym of rationalization - is sufficient to define it as an artifact. It is 
useless to have an unspecified talent or revelation in order to carry out this process. 
Curiosity, a sense of observation, the will to find and reconstitute the traces of its 
design, are sufficient [Micaelli, Forest 2003]. 
The situation is the same for the design process. It can also be observed empirically. 
It is then possible to identify its actors, it object, from that one design? How does the 
creativity appear? And so on. 
By this way we are close to the old institutionalist tradition according to which the 
realism of an organization theory must be based on the realism of its assumptions: 
"empirical success relates first to the need for founding empirically its assumptions. For 
social sciences it means to elaborate theories on relevant cognitive and behavioral 
assumptions from the observation point of view" [Bazzoli, Kirat, 2002:23].  
One is led to note that considering organizations from the science of design 
perspective invites us to question the epistemological bases of economic knowledge 
which holds, according to L. Bazzoli and T. Kirat, that the deductive method is the only 
scientific method that can be extended to the knowledge of institutional phenomena 
[Bazzoli, Kirat, 2002]. 
 
5. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The present contribution allowed us to note that while the concept of artificiality 
applied to organizations is not new, very few works employ it in the sense of designed 
artifact, neglecting the analysis of their design process. 
One might believe that such a situation implies an absence of interest to develop such 
a science of design. We nevertheless underlined the practical, institutional and 
epistemological issues at stake in such a development. 
Finally, from our perspective, what is at stake is the rehabilitation of the science of 
design which has been all to often neglected.  
We believe that this science of design (science of ingenium) can offer the social 
sciences, and particularly economics, a better understanding of the way organizations 
really work on the one hand and a new theoretical framework of firm evolution on the 
other. 
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